WORLD, Page 42EL SALVADORThe Battle for San SalvadorIn the worst bloodletting of the decade-long war, the fightingkills hundreds, drives tens of thousands from their homes -- andbrutally takes the lives of six JesuitsBy Jill Smolowe
With the world's attention focused on Eastern Europe, no one
expected the resurgence of an ugly little war in a troubled little
country on the American continent. Certainly not the El Salvadoran
armed forces, or the U.S. Government, which funds the Salvadoran
military to the tune of $85 million a year. Or the 5 million
war-weary citizens of El Salvador. All had been encouraged by two
recent rounds of peace talks to hope that a settlement in El
Salvador's ten-year civil war might be in the offing. Even when
the talks broke off three weeks ago amid a surge in civilian
killings and rumors of a guerrilla offensive, no one imagined that
the war would be brought from the countryside right into the
capital. But there are two roads to peace: one paved with goodwill,
the other littered with dead bodies. Last week the rebels of the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (F.M.L.N.) took the road
less traveled in recent years, and the savage fighting that
resulted will leave Salvadorans reeling for months to come.
The war that returned to El Salvador was vengeful and bloody.
In the worst slaughter of the decade, 3,500 leftist rebels battled
government troops all week in the streets of San Salvador and in
many of the country's 14 regions. The death toll: at least 208
troops, 676 guerrillas and hundreds -- no one knows precisely --
of civilians. Thousands more were wounded.
Most cold-blooded was the brutal slaying of six Jesuit priests,
which seemed to symbolize all that is wrong in El Salvador. While
no one has claimed responsibility, immediate suspicion centered on
the country's resurgent right-wing death squads. In the
predominantly Roman Catholic country, angry accusations and outrage
over the barbaric murders were certain to linger long after the
battle had died. And for the U.S., they raised once again the moral
dilemma of aiding a country where such acts have repeatedly gone
unpunished.
With his country's security threatened, President Alfredo
Cristiani declared a state of siege on the second day of fighting,
suspending constitutional liberties and imposing strict curfews.
It was not only the sudden flare-up of the long-stalemated
situation that caught Salvadorans by surprise, but it was also the
scope and intensity of the conflagration. Until now, the F.M.L.N.
has relied primarily on the traditional hit-and-run tactics of
guerrilla warfare, never winning, but never losing decisively. By
taking their battle to the capital, the rebels were forced to stand
their ground in a more conventional way. But the guerrillas lack
the equipment to rival the Salvadoran army's U.S.-supplied planes
and helicopter gunships, and as a result sustained heavy
casualties.
While both sides inflicted civilian casualties, the air attacks
by the army appeared to take the highest toll. On the periphery of
the capital, the poor neighborhoods believed to be rebel
strongholds were repeatedly strafed by rockets and machine-gun fire
from above. Some citizens alleged that bombs were indiscriminately
dropped in residential areas. Cristiani countered that the
government had authorized the use of bombs only where the army had
isolated F.M.L.N. units and was reasonably sure civilians would not
be injured. In many areas, citizens were forced to abandon their
homes, creating a stream of tens of thousands of refugees.
The motives behind the F.M.L.N. offensive were far from clear.
The extent of the assault prompted speculation that the guerrillas
were hoping a final sink-or-swim offensive would rally popular
support and bring down the six-month-old Cristiani government. If
that was the intent, the rebels missed their mark by a wide margin.
While their ability to infiltrate tons of arms and ammunition and
3,500 fighters into the capital demonstrated significant civilian
support, the guerrillas failed to spark a popular uprising. In
fact, the assault may have earned the rebels more new detractors
than supporters. Traditional political allies, such as the National
Revolutionary Movement, condemned the F.M.L.N. and called on it to
return to the negotiating table.
The rebels broke off peace talks on Nov. 2, following a bomb
attack on the headquarters of the left-leaning National Federation
of Salvadoran Workers that killed ten people. The bombing was
widely attributed to the right-wing death squads, which, after
slumbering for several years, are once again marauding throughout
El Salvador. The rebels hold Cristiani and his rightist Nationalist
Republican Alliance (ARENA) government responsible for both the
resurgence of the death squads and the arrest, injury or killing
of more than 400 suspected guerrilla sympathizers in recent months.
It is likely that last week's offensive was at least in part a
response to the wave of death-squad attacks.
But the boldness of the assault suggests that the rebels were
intent on disproving the government's claims that the F.M.L.N. is
a spent military force. It served warning that the government could
look forward to more bloodshed and violence if the guerrillas'
demands are not treated seriously.
The timing of the offensive may also reflect the guerrillas'
unease with developments in Eastern Europe. Just two months ago,
F.M.L.N. Commander Joaquin Villalobos admitted that his forces
could no longer "aspire to an armed revolution that the Soviet
Union will subsidize." Since then the pace of change in Eastern
Europe has accelerated so quickly that the F.M.L.N. may be worried
that it will be forgotten by its Communist patrons. Toward that
end, the F.M.L.N. may have been reminding both the Cristiani and
Bush administrations that with or without foreign Communist
support, the guerrillas must be part of any eventual settlement.
The Bush Administration heeded the message -- then bent it to
its own purposes, using the occasion to renew old charges against
Moscow. Secretary of State James Baker told the Organization of
American States that the Soviet Union "bears special responsibility
because its arms and its money, moving through Cuba and Nicaragua,
continue to support violence, destruction and war." While there was
no evidence of direct Soviet complicity, there were indications
that Nicaragua is continuing to arm the F.M.L.N.
Mostly, however, U.S. officials sought to downplay the crisis
that had caught them so unprepared. But beneath the bravado, there
were signs of unease. Officials who publicly condoned the
Salvadoran military's air attacks privately conceded that there was
no way to prevent them from causing civilian casualties. "There is
a serious human rights situation developing," admitted one
official.
For Cristiani, the situation is delicate. During his
presidential campaign, he courted votes by proclaiming his
impatience with the pace of fighting permitted by his predecessor,
Jose Napoleon Duarte. "The U.S. wants a low-intensity conflict,
meaning do so much not to win, but not to lose," he said in March
1988. "That's not fair to the military." He went on to say that if
the F.M.L.N. failed to accept a consensus proposal for peace, "that
would justify harsher military action." Having been treated to a
fairly easy first six months in office, Cristiani was finally put
to the test last week. What he demonstrated was that unlike Duarte,
he knows how to use the power of the armed forces to his advantage.
The problem, of course, is that as both sides strive to prove
that they can stand up to their enemy, it is the people of El
Salvador who reap the consequences. "If this spiral of violence
continues," warned San Salvador's Archbishop Arturo Rivera Damas,
"death and destruction will sweep away many, especially those who
are of most use to our people."
The Archbishop was speaking of the murder of the six Jesuits,
who taught at the University of Central America, one of the
country's most respected institutions and a center for leftist
theological activism. In the worst attack on Salvadoran Catholic
activists since the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo
Romero in 1980, they were mowed down by M-16 rifle fire at their
campus residence Thursday morning; a cook at the university and her
15-year-old daughter were also cut down. The government promptly
ordered an investigation, hinting that the rebels were responsible.
But the brutal massacre was widely believed, as was Romero's
slaying, to be the handiwork of right-wing death squads, and it
will be difficult to convince outraged citizens that the military
played no role.
In Washington officials voiced concern that Cristiani was
losing control to extremists within his party and the military.
There was speculation that the Treasury Police, who had raided the
priests' residence just days earlier, may have had a hand in the
murders. "This was incredibly stupid," said a U.S. official. "As
long as we've been telling army officials that they can't allow
this kind of thing to happen, they still haven't learned."
Two roads to peace remain open. The rebels seem prepared to
take either one. "There is still time to negotiate and prevent more
bloodshed," says F.M.L.N. representative Salvador Cortez. "But if
the government remains stubborn in its refusal to negotiate in good
faith, then we are prepared to continue until the end." Peace talks
are scheduled to resume in Caracas on Nov. 21. Government
representatives vow to be there; the rebels have said they will not
attend. The U.S. is urging them to return to the negotiating table.
The governments of Central America should lend their voices to that
call. Otherwise, nothing will change but the death toll.
